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I. INTRODUCTION
1

2

Declaratory judgments and res judicata share the common
3
goal of judicial efficiency. The two doctrines are brought into
conflict, however, when declaratory judgments are given preclusive
4
effect in subsequent litigation. To advance fairness and maintain
5
efficiency, the proper preclusive effect of declaratory judgments
must be determined with regard to current legal theories and
6
widely held policy positions. In its recent decision of State v. Joseph,
the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the same path it carved out
7
in its 1965 decision of Howe v. Nelson. The court had the
8
opportunity to reevaluate its position in light of developments
9
since Howe and adopt a litigant-friendly rule. Instead, the court
made the same mistake it made in Howe, by ignoring changes in the
Restatement of Judgments, failing to consider what other courts
have done, and applying a broad view of res judicata. In so doing,
1. BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 846 (7th ed. 1999) (defining declaratory judgment
as “[a] binding adjudication that establishes the rights and other legal relations of
the parties without providing for or ordering enforcement”).
2. Literally, “a thing adjudicated.” A DICTIONARY OF M ODERN LEGAL USAGE
763 (2d ed. 1995); BLACK’ S, supra note 1, at 1312 (defining res judicata as “1. An
issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision. 2. An affirmative
defense barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same
claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of
transactions and that could have been . . . raised in the first suit”).
3. In the case of declaratory actions, efficiency is afforded to litigants who
are able to narrow the issues of a controversy, or declare the rights and duties of a
legal relationship before they are interfered with or breached, respectively. EDWIN
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 55-56 (2d ed. 1941). See M INN. STAT. § 555.01
(2001) (stating “courts . . . shall have power to declare rights, status, and other
legal relations”). In terms of res judicata, eliminating piecemeal litigations,
multiple lawsuits, and wasteful litigations increases judicial efficiency. Wilson v.
Comm’r of Revenue, 619 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Minn. 2000).
4. Elizabeth L. Hisserich, The Collision of Declaratory Judgments and Res
Judicata, 48 UCLA L. REV. 159, 182 (2000).
5. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1955)
(Hand, J.) (“[I]t appears to us that the doctrine [of res judicata] . . . must be
treated as a compromise between two conflicting interests: the convenience of
avoiding a multiplicity of suits and the adequacy of the remedies afforded for
conceded wrongs.”).
6. 636 N.W.2d 322 (Minn. 2001).
7. 271 Minn. 296, 135 N.W.2d 687 (1965).
8. See discussion infra part III.
9. These developments include a clarification in the Restatement, see infra
Part II.C., the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Minneapolis Auto Parts Co. v. City of
Minneapolis, 739 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying Minnesota law), and the
increasing number of jurisdictions applying issue preclusion to declaratory
judgments, see infra Part V.B.
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the court limited the usefulness of declaratory actions in
10
Minnesota.
This case note considers how the Court’s recent decision in
Joseph continued the unfortunate practice of giving declaratory
judgments claim preclusive effect in Minnesota jurisprudence. Part
II analyzes the doctrines of res judicata and declaratory judgments
11
in general. Part III analyzes Minnesota’s experience with the two
12
13
doctrines. Part IV explains the significant facts and the court’s
14
holding in Joseph. Part V analyzes the collision of res judicata and
declaratory judgments and argues that the proper res judicata limit
15
of declaratory actions is issue preclusion. Part V also criticizes the
Minnesota Supreme Court for failing to consider new
developments in the law and establish a new, more workable
16
precedent. Part VI analyzes whether a statute of limitation should
17
apply to declaratory actions, and part VII concludes that issue
preclusion is the proper res judicata limit of declaratory
18
judgments.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Declaratory Actions
Adjudicating citizens’ rights as to each other and society at
large is a long-established function of the legal system, with roots in
19
Roman jurisprudence. Far removed from ancient Rome, the
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act standardized this function in
the United States and the great majority of states have adopted
20
some version of it. Today, parties use declaratory actions to
21
determine their rights, status, and other legal relations.
10. See infra Part V.B.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. See infra Part V.B.
16. See infra Part V.A.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. See infra Part VII.
19. BORCHARD, supra note 3, at 87-90.
20. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Declaratory Judgments § 5 (1988).
21. M INN. STAT. § 555.01 (2002). By declaring the rights, status and relations
between parties, declaratory actions serve the following purposes: 1. “afford a
speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating legal disputes”; 2. narrow the
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One of the chief merits of declaratory actions is that they
represent “a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating legal
22
disputes without invoking coercive remedies . . . .”
When
appropriate, parties can use declaratory judgments to dispose of
issues in the initial stages of dispute before proceeding to full23
blown litigation. In this fashion, declaratory suits save litigants
time and money by eliminating or reducing costly fishing
expeditions. Declaratory judgments also allow parties to quickly
(compared with coercive litigation) remove uncertainty and
insecurity from legal relations before parties take action that could
24
prove destructive to their interests.
issues and by so doing dispose of disputes in their initial stages, before they
consume precious resources; 3. make it unnecessary to destroy the status quo as a
condition to litigation, thereby preventing future litigation; 4. make it unnecessary
for a plaintiff to act upon his own interpretation of his rights, thus forbearing from
a contested step for fear of liability; 5. clarify, quiet, and stabilize legal relations by
removing uncertainty before irretrievable acts have been set in motion; 6. “enable
an issue of questioned status or facts on which a whole complex of rights may
depend to be expeditiously determined”; 7. “enable interdependent rights
involving numerous parties to be settled in a single action”; 8. obtain authoritative
guidance and protection against liability to trust administrators; 9. enable a
creditor or claimant to establish his or her claim, thereby preventing future injury;
10. enable a debtor to disavow burdens and remove the cloud on his or her rights;
11. “enable an obligor or contractor who maintains time or circumstance have
entitled him [or her] to release from his [or her] obligation to sue the obligee for
a declaration of release”; 12. “enable a person claiming his [or her] own privilege
or immunity or his [or her] adversary’s duty or liability to secure a judicial
recognition” without a full-fledged trial; 13. “enable public duties and powers to be
established without the cumbersome and technical prerequisites of mandamus,
certiorari, injunction, prohibition, or habeas corpus”; and 14. enable a claimant to
choose a “mild but adequate” and less harsh form of relief by declaration. Edwin
M. Borchard, The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 18 M INN. L. REV. 239, 257-60
(1934).
22. Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc. v. Deknatel, Inc., 512 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir.
1975) (paraphrasing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321, 325 (4th Cir.
1937)). Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles analyzed a similar statute based on
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act and concluded that “The statute . . . meets
a real need and should be liberally construed to . . . afford a speedy and
inexpensive method of adjudicating legal disputes without invoking the coercive
remedies . . . and to settle legal rights and remove uncertainty and insecurity from
legal relationships without awaiting a violation of the rights . . . .” 92 F.2d at 325. A
declaratory action in Kansas was filed, argued, and decided in a district court, then
appealed, argued and decided on appeal, all within one week. Ward v. Republic
County Comm’rs, 82 P.2d 84, 90 (Kan. 1938).
23. Borchard, supra note 21, at 257.
24. For example, parties unsure of their duties or obligations under a
contract can seek a judicial declaration clearly announcing the parties’ duties
instead of breaching a contract based on one or both of the parties’ interpretation
of the contract.
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Declaratory actions can also compliment, rather than take the
25
place of, coercive actions. A declaratory judgment does not bar or
merge a claim for further coercive relief based on the matters
26
declared. Instead, declaratory actions allow parties to narrow the
issues in dispute to those which merit prolonged discovery and
litigation. Then, based on the declaration of the contentious
issues, parties may pursue coercive relief to enforce the underlying
27
rights.
Generally, declaratory actions find their greatest utility in three
types of cases: those involving large corporations or government
officials who would rely on a mere declaration of the law to obey
28
it, those where judicial interpretation allows the parties to avoid
29
breaching a contract or violating a statute, and those where a
party who is challenged, threatened or endangered initiates
proceedings against her tormentor to eliminate the problem with a
30
judicial determination of her rights, privileges, and immunities.
B. Res Judicata
There is some confusion and little uniformity among courts,
commentators, and academics regarding the use of the terms res
judicata and collateral estoppel. “Res judicata” is often
interchanged with “claim preclusion,” and “collateral estoppel”
31
replaces “issue preclusion” in some contexts. At the same time,
25. William P.S. Breese, Atrocities of Declaratory Judgments Law, 31 M INN. L. REV.
575, 575-91 (1947).
26. See M INN. STAT. § 555.08 (2002) (stating further relief pursuant to a
declaratory judgment may be granted if necessary or proper).
27. See id.
28. BORCHARD, supra note 3, at 279.
29. Used in this way, declaratory actions can help preserve economic and
social relations. Id. at 280.
30. Id.
31. Courts tend to use res judicata and collateral estoppel, while the
Restatement and some academics use claim and issue preclusion, respectively.
Compare Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (using res judicata and collateral
estoppel) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 31 (1982) (using claim and
issue preclusion) and Allen D. Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion/Res Judicata, 62
M ICH. L. REV. 33, 33-34 (1963) (using claim and issue preclusion). The idiom
“issue preclusion” appears to have been coined by Allen D. Vestal, an adviser to
the American Law Institute during drafting of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, in his law review article The Constitution and Preclusion/Res Judicata. Id.
at 34, n.7. (stating the term “issue preclusion” had not been used by the court with
intent, though the court came close in Frost v. Frost, 23 N.Y.S.2d 754, 757 (1940)
(“the plaintiff is precluded from litigating the issue now”)).
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some authorities consider res judicata to encompass both claim
32
preclusion and issue preclusion.
This note uses “claim
preclusion” and “issue preclusion” to refer to the specific doctrines
and “res judicata” to refer to the overall judicial notion that
33
judgments have preclusive effects on subsequent claims.
Res judicata is a doctrine of judicial efficiency that courts apply
in part to alleviate crowded dockets and “in order to relieve parties
of the burden of relitigating issues already determined in a prior
action, [so] that a party may not be ‘twice vexed for the same
34
cause.’” In particular, claim preclusion is used to bar subsequent
suits predicated on the same cause of action regardless of the issues
35
previously litigated.
Issue preclusion prevents a party from
relitigating a specific issue that was determined in prior litigation if
36
the issue was “necessary and essential” to the former judgment.
While issue preclusion is narrow and specific, claim preclusion is a
broad sword that has more capability to prevent litigation.
Although both doctrines reflect courts’ strong disfavor with
37
wasteful lawsuits, courts use them cautiously so as not to deprive
38
litigants of their day in court.
C. The Collision of Res Judicata and Declaratory Judgments
39

Declaratory relief is an alternative remedy available for use in

32. See BLACK’ S, supra note 2; RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, reporter’s note.
E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Extent to Which Principles of Res Judicata are Applicable to
Judgments in Actions for Declaratory Relief, 10 A.L.R.2d 782, 782-83 (1950).
33. In other words, the article uses “res judicata” to encompass both “claim
preclusion” and “issue preclusion.”
34. Beutz v. A. O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 431 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Minn.
1988) (quoting Shimp v. Sederstrom, 305 Minn. 267, 270, 233 N.W.2d 292, 294
(1975)).
35. Hauser v. Mealey, 263 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn. 1978).
36. Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn.
1982) (quoting 1 B.J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, M OORE’ S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.433[1]
(2d ed. 1948)).
37. Wilson v. Comm’r of Revenue, 619 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Minn. 2000).
38. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979) (“[R]es judicata may govern
grounds and defenses not previously litigated, however, it blockades unexplored
paths that may lead to truth. For the sake of repose, res judicata shields the fraud
and the cheat as well as the honest person. It therefore is to be invoked only after
careful inquiry.”). See also United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 614 (3d Cir.
1948) (“Such a rule of public policy must be watched in its application lest a blind
adherence to it tend to defeat the even firmer established policy of giving every
litigant a full and fair day in court.”).
39. See Breese, supra note 25, at 575.
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40

resolving disputes or potential disputes in a fashion that is faster,
41
cheaper, and less harsh than coercive relief. The doctrine of res
judicata curtails litigants’ ability to seek judicial redress of a
42
dispute. The two doctrines collide when res judicata prohibits
plaintiffs from seeking coercive relief because of a prior declaratory
judgment. This collision forces the issue: What is the proper
preclusive effect of a declaratory judgment? The decision is an
important one—too much preclusive effect and the use of
declaratory actions is frustrated; too little preclusive effect and
declaratory actions become futile and unavailing.
43
State courts, including Minnesota’s, have historically turned
to the Restatement of Judgments to help determine the proper res
44
judicata limit of a declaratory judgment. Unfortunately, the first
Restatement was not particularly helpful; section 77 contained the
following vague suggestion for the res judicata effect of a
declaratory judgment: “Where an action is brought to obtain a
declaration . . . a final and valid judgment . . . is binding between
45
the parties in subsequent actions.” The comment describes a
declaratory action as the request for a judicial declaration rather
46
than the promotion of a claim. In short, the first Restatement of
Judgments failed to overtly specify the proper preclusive effect for
declaratory judgments. Nonetheless, some courts have read the
vague language of section 77 to suggest that claim preclusion was
47
the proper res judicata limit of a declaratory judgment.
40. Although the constitutional requirement of justiciability generally
requires genuine or present controversy, this requirement is viewed leniently in
actions for declaratory judgment and is satisfied if there is controversy of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant issuance of judgment. Rice Lake Contracting
Corp. v. Rust Env’t and Infrastructure, Inc., 549 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 33 cmt. c (1980) (“A declaratory
action is intended to provide a remedy that is simpler and less harsh than coercive
relief.”).
42. See supra part II.B.
43. Minneapolis Auto Parts Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 739 F.2d 408, 410 (8th
Cir. 1984); Howe v. Nelson, 271 Minn. 296, 301, 135 N.W.2d 687, 691-92 (1965).
44. See Hisserich, supra note 4, at 173-74 (enumerating twenty-five different
jurisdictions in the United States that have analyzed and cited section 33 of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments).
45. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 77 (1942).
46. Id. at § 77 cmt. b.
47. See, e.g., C.F. & I. Steel Corp. v. Charnes, 637 P.2d 324, 328 (Co. 1981);
Slattery v. Maykut, 405 A.2d 76, 82 (Ct. 1978); Herd v. Lyttle, 222 S.W.2d 834, 837
(Ky. 1949); Howe, 271 Minn. at 296, 135 N.W.2d at 691-92; Davlee Const. Corp. v.
Brooks, 188 N.Y.S.2d 847, 852 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); Great N. R.R. Co. v. Mustad,
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Section 33 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
improved the situation by expressly adopting issue preclusion as
48
the res judicata limit of declaratory judgments. In the past two
decades, an increasing number of state courts have determined
that issue preclusion is the proper preclusive effect of declaratory
judgment actions. Now, eighteen jurisdictions have adopted issue
49
preclusion as the res judicata limit of a declaratory judgment.
III. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN MINNESOTA
Minnesota became the eighteenth American state to adopt the
50
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act in 1933, authorizing
51
Minnesota courts to entertain declaratory actions. Since then,
declaratory actions have been used continuously by Minnesota
litigants to simplify and shorten lawsuits, thereby conserving
precious resources.
The Minnesota Supreme Court first analyzed the res judicata
effect of a declaratory judgment in its 1965 decision of Howe v.
52
Nelson.
The court applied claim preclusion to a declaratory
judgment, holding that “the res judicata effect of a judgment in a
declaratory judgment action is essentially no different from the res
53
judicata effect of any other judgment.” The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals made a different choice, but avoided direct conflict with
the Minnesota high court in Minneapolis Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. City of
54
Minneapolis.
The Eighth Circuit simply noted that the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments is at odds with the Minnesota

33 N.W.2d 436, 441 (N.D. 1948).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 33 (1980) (stating that in
accordance with the rules of issue preclusion, a valid and final judgment in a
declaratory action is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties as to
any issues actually litigated).
49. See infra Part V.B.
50. Borchard, supra note 21, at 239.
51. M INN. STAT. § 555.01 (2002) (“Courts . . . shall have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed. . . . The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and
effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or
decree.”).
52. 271 Minn. 296, 135 N.W.2d 687 (1965).
53. Id. at 301, 135 N.W.2d at 691. The court erred in Howe because a
declaratory action does not seek redress of a claim; instead it seeks the
determination of rights, status, and other legal relations between parties. Compare
M INN. STAT. § 555.01 (1965) with RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 77 (1942).
54. 739 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying Minnesota law).
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55

Supreme Court’s decision in Howe. The Eighth Circuit found that
the Restatement (Second) limits the effects of res judicata in pure
56
57
declaratory actions to an issue preclusive effect. Thus, leading
up to Joseph, Minnesota courts were applying claim preclusion to
declaratory judgments, while the Eighth Circuit’s case law held that
58
issue preclusion was the proper limit.
IV. THE J OSEPH DECISION
A. Facts & Procedural History
On November 27, 1992, Barbara and James Joseph (the
Josephs) struck Minnesota State Highway Patrol Trooper William F.
59
60
Henry (Henry) with their minivan. Henry was severely injured.
The Josephs, who worked as clergy for Two Harbors Gospel
Tabernacle (Tabernacle), initially claimed they were on church
61
business at the time of the accident. Royal Insurance Company
55. Compare id. at 410 (stating the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
restricts the preclusive effect of a declaratory judgment to matters declared) with
Howe, 271 Minn. at 301, 135 N.W.2d at 691 (stating the res judicata effect of a
declaratory judgment is the same as the res judicata effect of any other judgment).
56. Minneapolis Auto Parts Co., 739 F.2d at 410 (applying Minnesota law).
“Pure” declaratory actions do not seek coercive relief or both coercive and
declaratory relief. Courts apply the declaratory judgment exception to res judicata
solely to pure declaratory actions. Stericycle, Inc. v. City of Delavan, 120 F.3d 657,
659–60 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Wisconsin state law); Cimasi v. City of Fenton,
838 F.2d 298, 299 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Missouri law); Mandarino v. Pollard,
718 F.2d 845, 847-49 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying Illinois law); State v. Smith, 720
P.2d 40, 41 n.2 (Alaska 1986); Mycogan Corp. v. Monsato Co., 51 P.3d 297 (Cal.
2002).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 33 (1980):
A valid and final judgment in an action brought to declare rights or
other legal relations . . . is conclusive in a subsequent action between
them as to the matters declared, and, in accordance with the rules of issue
preclusion, as to any issues actually litigated by them and determined in
the action.
Id. (emphasis added); “[A] declaratory action determines only what it actually
decides and does not have a claim preclusive effect on other contentions that
might have been advanced.” Id. at cmt. c. But see Fournier v. Ill. Cas. Co., 391
N.W.2d 258, 260 (Iowa 1986) (analyzing section 33 of the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments and applying claim preclusion to a declaratory judgment).
58. Compare N. Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184 F.3d
732, 737 (8th Cir. 1999); Minneapolis Auto Parts Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 739
F.2d 408, 410 (8th Cir. 1984); with Howe, 271 Minn. at 301, 135 N.W.2d at 691.
59. State v. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Minn. 2001).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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62

(Royal) had issued the Josephs’ personal insurance policy.
63
Tabernacle maintained an excess liability policy with Church
Mutual Insurance Company (Mutual) covering employees of
64
Tabernacle acting within the scope of their employment. After
the accident, Mutual received three investigative reports indicating
65
the Josephs were on church business at the time of the accident.
66
In 1993, Henry sued the Josephs for his injuries. The Josephs
and Royal settled the suit in 1994 for $250,000, but the agreement
reserved satisfaction of the judgment to the Mutual excess liability
67
policy limit. Royal tendered defense of the suit to Mutual who
accepted the suit, but reserved its right to deny coverage based on
68
the validity of the claim. Sometime before October 30, 1995, the
Josephs testified individually that they were on church business at
69
the time of the accident. Later, on November 2, 1995, Mr. Joseph
sent a statement to Mutual indicating that at the time of the
70
accident the Josephs were not on church business. The following
71
day, Mutual notified the Josephs they were denying coverage.
Almost a week later, on November 9, 1995, the jury delivered a
72
73
verdict against the Josephs, which they appealed. The court of
74
appeals reversed in part and remanded the issue of liability. The
district court granted summary judgment against the Josephs who
75
76
again appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded.
62. Id.
63. The Church Mutual policy provided: “This insurance shall be excess
insurance over any other valid and collectable insurance for bodily injury liability,
property damage liability and for medical payments.” Brief for Appellants at A-15,
Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322 (No. C2-00-1364).
64. Id. The Church Mutual policy provides that the following persons are
insured: “Any person who is an officer, clergyman or employee of the named
insured, but only while acting in the performance of and within the scope of his
duties as such.” Id.
65. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d at 324.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 325.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The jury found Barbara Mae Joseph completely negligent in the causation
of Henry’s injuries and awarded Henry over $3,000,000.00 in damages. Brief for
Appellants at 3, Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322 (No.C2-00-1364).
73. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d at 325.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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On remand, a second trial on the issue of liability resulted in
77
78
another verdict favoring Henry. No appeal followed.
On October 27, 1999, Mutual initiated a declaratory lawsuit to
establish that the Josephs were not on church business at the time
79
of the accident. On February 16, 2000 the Washington County
District Court dismissed the suit as time-barred, holding the six-year
80
contracts statute of limitations had run. Mutual did not appeal
81
the judgment, and the judgment became final in April of 2000.
On October 29, 1999, the state initiated a garnishment
proceeding naming Mutual as the garnishee and the Josephs as
82
debtors.
Mutual raised an affirmative defense claiming the
Josephs were not on church business and were therefore not
83
covered under the Tabernacle policy. Henry intervened in the
proceeding, asserting res judicata barred Mutual from relitigating
84
the scope of employment issue. On cross motions for summary
judgment, the Chisago County District Court held that the
declaratory suit collaterally estopped Mutual from relitigating the
85
scope of employment issue. Mutual appealed and the court of
appeals reversed, holding the declaratory suit did not collaterally
86
estop Mutual from raising the defense. The court of appeals
reasoned that the declaratory action never reached the merits of
the case, and therefore, Mutual never had the opportunity to
87
present evidence on the scope of employment issue.
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Holding
88

In deciding Joseph, the Supreme Court applied principles of
89
res judicata rather than claim or issue preclusion. The court held
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d at 325 (citing M INN. STAT. § 541.05 subd. 1 (2001)).
81. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court was particularly unsympathetic to
Mutual’s position because Mutal failed to appeal the Washington County
declaratory judgment. Id. at 329 (stating Mutual had both the right and the
opportunity to appeal).
82. Id. at 325.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 326.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 327.
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that res judicata:
operates as an absolute bar to a subsequent claim when:
(1) the earlier claim involved the same claim for relief;
(2) the earlier claim involved the same parties or their
privies;
(3) there was a final judgment on the merits; and
(4) the estopped party had a full and fair opportunity to
90
litigate the matter.”
The court held that a declaratory judgment bars the relitigation of
91
all litigated claims as well as claims that could have been litigated.
Specifically, the court found: (1) Mutual’s scope of
employment defense was identical to the issue in the declaratory
92
93
action; (2) the parties were the same in both actions; and (3)
although the Washington County District Court dismissed Mutual’s
declaratory complaint on a Rule 12 motion, the judgment was on
94
the merits. Finally, the court concluded that Mutual had “a full
and fair opportunity” to litigate the coverage defense in the
95
Washington County declaratory action.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE J OSEPH DECISION
In Joseph, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed its 1965
decision of Howe—holding claim preclusion as the res judicata limit
96
of a declaratory judgment —despite the clarification provided by
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments in 1982.
A. Failure to Consider New Res Judicata Developments in the Law
Deciding Joseph, the court failed to analyze section 33 of the
97
Restatement (Second) of Judgments. The Restatement limits the
98
res judicata effect of declaratory judgments to issue preclusion.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Wilson v. Comm’r of Revenue, 619 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Minn.
2000); Care Inst., Inc.-Roseville v. County of Ramsey, 612 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn.
2000)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 328.
95. Id. (quoting Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc. 917 F.2d 1507, 1521 (10th Cir.
1990)).
96. Id. at 326 n.1 (stating res judicata applies to all claims actually litigated as
well as to all claims that could have been). Id. at 327.
97. State v. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322 (Minn. 2001).
98. See supra Part II.C.
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The Joseph opinion did not refer to the Restatement or contain a
discussion of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s rationale for
99
adopting claim preclusion. In contrast, when the Eighth Circuit
addressed the same issue in Minneapolis Auto Parts Co. v. City of
100
Minneapolis,
that court closely analyzed section 33 of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments and provided an in depth
101
analysis of the proper res judicata limit.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s most recent analysis of the
proper res judicata limit of declaratory judgments was Howe v.
102
Nelson. The similarity of the facts between Joseph and Howe, and
the Joseph court’s reliance on Howe exacerbate the lack of
consideration of the Restatement (Second) and the decisions of
103
other jurisdictions.
The Howe court meticulously analyzed the
state of res judicata law as it pertained to declaratory judgments at
the time by analyzing an exhaustive list of authorities including a
104
105
106
law review, a treatise, the Restatement, the American Law
107
108
Reports, and eight decisions from other jurisdictions.
The
109
Joseph court cited only one treatise and no out-of-state cases. In
99. 636 N.W.2d 322.
100. 739 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984).
101. Id. at 410. The Eighth Circuit found Minneapolis Auto distinguishable
from Minnesota precedent and section 33. Id.
102. 271 Minn. 296, 135 N.W.2d 687 (1965).
103. Although the Joseph court only cited Howe three times (see Joseph, 636
N.W.2d at 327), the facts of Howe are remarkably similar to Joseph. Compare Joseph,
636 N.W.2d 322, with Howe, 271 Minn. 296, 135 N.W.2d 687. Both cases involve a
car accident, both contained an initial declaratory suit instituted by an insurance
company construing automobile policies, both spawned from a personal injury
suit against the insured, and both involved a subsequent garnishment suit.
104. Howe, 271 Minn. at 303, 135 N.W.2d at 692 n.14 (citing Developments in the
Law – Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787 (1949)).
105. Howe, 271 Minn. 296, 303, 135 N.W.2d 687, 693 n.15 (1965) (citing
BORCHARD, supra note 3).
106. Id. at 301-02, 135 N.W.2d at 692 (analyzing section 77, comment b of the
original Restatement of Judgments and concluding that the comment urges a
salutary caution in granting the effect of res judicata to declaratory judgments; the
court, however, applied claim preclusion to the declaratory judgment at issue).
Section 33 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments reaffirms section 77 of the
original Restatement of Judgments. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 33
reporter’s note (1982). Section 33 went further and added language expressly
adopting issue preclusion as the res judicata limit of a declaratory judgment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 33 (1982).
107. Howe, 271 Minn. at 301, 135 N.W.2d at 692 (citing E. H. Schopler,
Annotation, Extent to Which Principles of Res Judicata are Applicable to Judgments in
Actions for Declaratory Relief, 10 A.L.R.2d 782 (1950)).
108. See generally id.
109. See generally State v. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322 (Minn. 2001).
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contrast to Minnesota, other state courts have looked far and wide
in search of the proper res judicata limit. For instance, in AerojetGen. Corp. v. Am. Excess Ins. Co., California relied on the decisions of
110
seven other jurisdictions and in Cromer v. Sefton, Indiana cited ten
111
out-of-state cases to make a proper analysis.
Short of legislative action, the final determination of the res
judicata limit to apply to declaratory judgments belongs to the
Minnesota Supreme Court. But in Joseph, the court should have
analyzed the change in the Restatement, the decisions of other
jurisdictions and explained its detour from the norm.
B. Issue Preclusion – Why it is the Better Choice
The Minnesota Supreme Court should have joined the 18
other state courts that have recognized issue preclusion as the res
112
judicata limit of a declaratory judgment.
Nationally, thirteen
state courts have hewed to section 33 of the Restatement
113
(Second), five have adopted issue preclusion without analyzing
114
the Restatement, five (including Minnesota) have adopted claim
115
preclusion, and twenty-seven states have not squarely addressed
the issue. By adopting claim preclusion, the Minnesota Supreme
110. 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 427, 435-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
111. 471 N.E.2d 700, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 33, 77 (1982); 22A AM. JUR. 2D
Declaratory Judgments §§ 239-240 (1988).
113. Jackinsky v. Jackinsky, 894 P.2d 650, 656 (Alaska 1995); Aerojet-Gen.
Corp. v. Am. Excess Ins. Co., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427, 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002);
Eason v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 961 P.2d 537, 540 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997); N.
Shore Realty Corp. v. Gallaher, 99 So. 2d 255, 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957);
Cromer v. Sefton, 471 N.E.2d 700, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Bankers & Shippers
Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Electro Enters., Inc., 415 A.2d 278, 284 (Md. 1980); Boyd v.
Jamaica Plain Coop. Bank, 386 N.E.2d 775, 779 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); Radkay v.
Confalone, 575 A.2d 355, 357 (N.H. 1990); State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Heights,
765 N.E.2d 345, 355 (Ohio 2002); Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Cent.
Liquor Co., 421 P.2d 244, 247 (Okla. 1966); Robison v. Asbill, 492 S.E.2d 400, 401
(S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Carver v. Heikkila, 465 N.W.2d 183, 186 (S.D. 1991); Martin
v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998);.
114. Salvatore v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 39 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2001); Warwick v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 271 So. 2d 94, 96 (Miss.
1972); Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990);
Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 183 A.2d 415, 419 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962);
In re Cox, 388 S.E.2d 199, 201 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
115. Smith v. Barfield, 276 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Downen v. Country
Mut. Ins. Co. 537 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Fournier v. Ill. Cas. Co., 391
N.W.2d 258 (Iowa 1986); Hoffman v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 535 N.W.2d 529 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1995); State v. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322 (Minn. 2001).
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Court significantly limited the efficacy of declaratory actions in
116
Minnesota.
Claim preclusion is too preclusive for declaratory judgments
and preserving claim preclusion as the res judicata limit of
117
118
declaratory judgments will have a “chilling effect” on their use.
Attorneys will advise their clients to avoid using declaratory actions
to ensure they do not lose any claims they may have. Thus, the
time and money saving advantages of declaratory actions are lost to
judicial efficiency and, as a result, lawsuits will be more numerous
119
and broader in scope.
It is helpful and illustrative to apply these doctrines to an
elementary example in contract law. Parties to a contract can seek
a declaration of their rights and duties under the agreement
120
pursuant to a perceived conflict. With claim preclusion as the
116. Declaratory actions are an important part of the legal landscape in
Minnesota. See Borchard, supra note 21, at 257-60 (listing the purposes of
declaratory judgments). As previously noted, litigants can use declaratory actions
to calm their senses and act on an informed basis. Id. at 258 (stating declaratory
judgments remove uncertainty and insecurity from legal relations thereby
clarifying, quieting and stabilizing legal relationships). Properly used, declaratory
actions save litigants precious time and money by derailing controversies before
damages occur; they also help litigants avoid the attorneys’ fees consonant with
full-fledged coercive litigations. See E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co.,
88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 1937) (stating that Congress’s intent was to circumvent
the “accrual of avoidable damages to one not certain of his rights and to afford
him an early adjudication without waiting until his adversary should see fit to
begin suit, after damage had accrued”). See also Hisserich, supra note 4, at 160
(stating that because declaratory actions can be brought earlier than coercive
actions and before damages accrue, they “serve a useful protective function by
allowing the parties to know their responsibilities to one another before they are
violated. By focusing on a specific issue at contention between the parties, the
court can resolve the problem relatively quickly, avoiding the expense and strain
of full-scale litigation”). Note that in addition to the savings litigants realize,
declaratory actions conserve court resources by discouraging the use of more time
consuming coercive actions. Id.
117. BLACK’ S, supra note 1, at 233 (defining chilling effect as “the result when any
practice is discouraged”). See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 554 (2001) (using
“chilling effect” to refer to the effect public disclosure of private conversations will
have on private speech by individuals); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 913 n.30
(2000) (using “chilling effect” to refer to the effect government entanglement has
on the mission of a church parish).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 33 cmt. c (1982) (“Application of
bar might also be undesirable because the risk of bar would discourage declaratory
actions in the preclaim situation or at least discourage a possibly useful even
though partial presentation of the controversy.”).
119. Hisserich, supra note 4, at 182 (stating that if declaratory judgments
receive full claim preclusive effect, the court system will be further burdened).
120. M INN. STAT. § 555.01 (2002); Thuma v. Kroschel, 506 N.W.2d 14, 21
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effect of the declaratory judgment, the judgment will bar any
121
further declaration on the contract in the future.
This result
encourages the parties to argue every clause of the agreement
during the declaratory action, consuming more time, money and
energy than necessary. To avoid this result, parties will refrain
from bringing a declaratory action that would otherwise quickly
and efficiently resolve at least some issues. Instead, parties are
122
forced to live with uncertainty that could be avoided. On the
other hand, if a party does seek and obtain a declaratory judgment,
application of claim preclusion to the judgment requires a party to
123
breach the contract before further relief could be sought. This
124
breach will cause damages and escalate costs.
The application of issue preclusion yields a better result.
Applying issue preclusion to the contract hypothetical, a
declaratory action does not force the parties to litigate every issue
on the contract at one time. Thus, they are free to seek guidance
on any crucial issue they are uncertain about, consuming only the
time and money absolutely necessary while eliminating the
125
uncertainty declaratory judgments are designed to end. For the
parties, obtaining an efficient declaration of the contract at this
stage would avoid individual interpretations and the possible
accompanying damages that flow from a breach of contract. In this
hypothetical, the parties are able to save time and money by
utilizing the declaratory action.
Expanding the effect of
declaratory judgments to claim preclusion will result in reluctant
126
use of the time and money saving declaratory form of action.
At first glance, it may seem that multiple suits will be reduced
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
121. See Walsh Constr. Co. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 153 F.3d 830, 833 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that a declaratory judgment in Illinois bars subsequent
litigation on a contract through the operation of claim preclusion).
122. See Borchard, supra note 21, at 258 (stating declaratory judgments remove
uncertainty and insecurity from legal relations).
123. See M INN. STAT. § 555.08 (2002) (stating further relief pursuant to a
declaratory judgment may be granted if necessary or proper).
124. Breach of contract produces one of three types of damages: expectation,
reliance, or restitution. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979).
Expectation damages attempt to put a party in the position he/she would have
been in had the contract been performed, otherwise known as benefit of the
bargain damages. Id. Reliance damages compensate for loss occurring as a result
of relying on the contract to perform or even prepare to perform. Id. Restitution
damages restore any benefit conferred on another party. Id.
125. See Borchard, supra note 21, at 258.
126. Hisserich, supra note 4, at 182.
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and judicial efficiency will be served by setting claim preclusion as
127
the res judicata limit of declaratory judgments.
However, the
benefit is not as great as it may initially appear. Declaratory
judgments with vast preclusive effect will encourage litigants to
128
pursue more coercive suits. In the end, the result may be more
full-fledged coercive lawsuits and, consequently, more congested
129
dockets.
Thus, judicial economy will be disserved. Lastly,
discouraging declaratory actions dissuades parties from asserting
their rights and encourages the reluctance to protect their legal
130
position.
VI. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
The clearest and most sweeping effect of the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s decision in Joseph is the affirmation of claim
preclusion as the res judicata limit of declaratory judgments. The
decision left open other civil procedure issues such as whether
statutes of limitation apply to defenses in coercive suits or
131
declaratory actions in general. This section provides an analysis
of applying a statute of limitation to declaratory actions.
A. Background
Statutes of limitation limit the amount of time in which a cause
132
of action can be initiated. They are a compromise between the
interest of eliminating stale claims and the interest of deciding all
133
claims on their substantive merits. Statutes of limitation are an
important tool of public policy helping ensure the accuracy of the
127. Walsh Constr. Co. of Ill. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitt., Pa., 153 F.3d
830, 832 (7th Cir. 1993).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 33 cmt. C (stating declaratory
actions are simpler and are not as expansive as their full-blown coercive
counterparts).
129. Hisserich, supra note 4, at 163 (arguing that declaratory judgments help
reduce some of the strain on an already burdened legal system).
130. See Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 240 N.W.2d 610, 624-25 (Wis. 1976) (stating
declaratory actions provide a remedy that is anticipatory or preventative in
nature).
131. State v. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Minn. 2001) (stating the court of
appeals held that a statute of limitations does not apply to declaratory actions or
defenses. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not address either issue).
132. BLACK’ S, supra note 1, at 1422 (defining statute of limitations as “a statute
establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case”).
133. Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of
Limitations, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 454-55 (1997).
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fact-finding process, the reduction of litigation costs, the
136
preservation of integrity in the legal system, and the repose of
137
defendants.
Statutes of limitation are arbitrary; they do not
discriminate between just and unjust claims, or avoidable and
138
unavoidable delays.
B. Minnesota
Statutes of limitation have been a mainstay in Minnesota since
139
140
early statehood. Neither the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act
nor Minnesota’s adopted version of the Uniform Declaratory
141
Judgment Act address the issue of whether a statute of limitation
142
applies to a declaratory action. Minnesota case law interpreting
143
the act is largely silent.
C. Analysis
The policies furthered by statutes of limitation are not served if
144
declaratory actions can be brought without limitation.
Most
134. Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980) (stating the fact
finding process is more reliable if the witness or testimony in question is relatively
fresh and therefore there comes a time when even meritorious claims must be
barred from litigation).
135. Litigating sooner than later is cheaper because evidence deteriorates and
memories fade creating more need for discovery, more documents to be entered
into evidence, and more testimony from more witnesses. These costs burden the
system as a whole because trial courts must preside over the longer trials and the
individual parties who have to pay their attorneys to present more evidence and
examine more witnesses.
136. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 133, at 481.
137. Id. at 457.
138. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
139. See, e.g., Gen. St. 1849-58 c. 60 §§ 3–9; M INN. STAT. §§ 541.01–541.22
(2002) (stating Chapter 541 is derived from public statute chapter 60 of 1858).
Minnesota became a state when Congress passed the Convention Act of Legislative
Assembly on May 23, 1857.
140. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (2002).
141. M INN. STAT. §§ 555.01– 555.16 (2002).
142. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (2002); M INN STAT. §§ 555.01–555.16
(2002).
143. See generally M INN. STAT. §§ 555.01–555.16 (2002). But see Fryberger v.
Township of Fredenberg, 428 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that declaratory judgments in Minnesota are not subject to statutes of limitation);
State v. Joseph, 622 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that absent a
statutory mandate, declaratory actions are not barred by statutes of limitations)
rev’d on other grounds by State v. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322 (Minn. 2001).
144. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 133 (arguing that statutes of limitations
promote repose, minimize deterioration of evidence, place defendants and
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notably, courts could not escape considering and relying upon stale
evidence during declaratory actions. Stale evidence obscures the
accurate pursuit of justice because memories fade and documents
are lost.
As a direct result, stale evidence costs litigants
considerable time and money tracking down old documents and
145
old witnesses.
If statutes of limitation do not apply to declaratory actions,
defendants would never be able to relinquish their guard. They
would have to be prepared to defend themselves in declaratory
actions virtually forever. This, in turn, may cause potential
defendants considerable unneeded strain and uncertainty,
including unnecessarily increased costs from litigation and liability
insurance coverage.
From the standpoint of judicial efficiency, if the underlying
claim were beyond the limitations period, a declaratory judgment
would have no effect because the plaintiff would not be able to seek
further coercive relief, thus wasting the time and money of parties
and courts. Legislatures adopted statutes of limitation to eliminate
146
these problems.
Minnesota’s Declaratory Judgment Act has a possible solution
147
built into it.
For instance, Minnesota trial court judges have
discretion to refuse a declaratory action if it will not relieve the
148
underlying uncertainty that precipitated the action. Indeed, it
may seem straightforward that this discretion would allow trial
courts to dismiss declaratory actions based on an underlying claim
that had exceeded the limitations period. Nevertheless, without
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion on this matter, the
current state of the law is not clear and, arguably, the decision of
the Minnesota Court of Appeals in State v. Joseph remains binding
149
precedent.
Nearly every state applies statutes of limitation to declaratory
plaintiffs on an equal footing, promote cultural values of diligence, encourage the
prompt enforcement of substantive law, avoid retrospective application of
contemporary standards, and reduce the volume of litigation. The article
concedes that statutes of limitations do not promote adjudication of claims upon
their substantive merits nor are they conducive to the vindication of meritorious
claims).
145. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 133, at 480.
146. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 133, at 454.
147. M INN. STAT. § 555.06 (2002).
148. Id.
149. 622 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that absent a
statutory mandate, declaratory actions are not barred by statutes of limitations).
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actions. However, states have taken one of three approaches to
determine which statute of limitation applies. The first applies the
150
limitations period applicable to the underlying claim.
The
second approach uses a statute of limitation that applies to all
151
causes of action not specifically provided for in other statutes.
The third approach adopts a new statute that covers only
152
declaratory actions.
The most logical approach is to apply the statute of limitation
of the underlying claim to bar a declaratory action based on the
same issue. Aligning the two limitations periods enhances judicial
efficiency because after the statute of limitation lapses, no coercive
relief could be provided on the basis of the declaratory judgment.
Thus, resources spent in pursuit of the declaratory judgment would
be wasted.
In Joseph, the Minnesota Supreme Court should have imparted
that declaratory actions are subject to the statute of limitation
applicable to the underlying cause of action. Doing so would have
cleared up any confusion following the court of appeal’s decision
150. Karedes v. Collela, 740 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529 (2002); Nash v. MacDonald, 112
Cal.Rptr. 2d 230, 239 (2001) rev’d on other grounds; W. Gate Vill. Ass’n v. Dubois,
761 A.2d 1066, 1072 (N.H. 2000); Allied Investment Corp. v. Jasen, 716 A.2d 1085,
1094 (Md. App. 1998); Page v. LeRoux, 685 N.E.2d 1205, 1207 (Mass. App. Ct.
1997); Wilson v. Kelley, 617 A.2d 433, 436 (Conn. 1992); Brooks v. Dierker, 552
P.2d 533, 535 (Or. 1976); Russell v. First York Sav. Co., 352 N.W.2d 871, 875 (Neb.
1984); Taylor v. Lovelace Clinic, 432 P.2d 816, 818 (N.M. 1967); Dehoff v.
Attorney General, 564 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1978); Maynard v. Bd. of Ed. of
Wayne County, 357 S.E.2d 246, 251 (W.Va. 1987); DeWitt v. Balben, 718 P.2d 854,
858 (Wyo. 1986).
151. Basically courts adopting this method use a generic statute of limitations
as a catchall. See, e.g., Hollywood Lakes Section Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. City of
Hollywood, 676 So.2d 500, 501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (rehearing denied
August 1, 1996) (construing “[a]ctions other than for recovery of real property
shall be commenced . . . [w]ithin four years . . . [including] [a]ny action not
specifically provided for in these statutes” to include declaratory actions)
(referencing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (2002)); Wagner v. Apollo Gas Co., 582 A.2d
364, 366 (Pa. Super. 1990) (construing “the following actions and proceedings
must be commenced within four years: . . . [a]n action upon a contract, obligation
or liability founded upon a writing not specified in paragraph (7), under seal or
otherwise, except an action subject to another limitation specified in this
subchapter” to cover a declaratory action on one of the underlying areas of law)
(referencing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5525 (2002) (as amended)); 145 Kisco Ave.
Corp. v. Dufner Enters., 604 N.Y.S.2d 963, 965 (N.Y.A.D. 1993) (construing “[t]he
following actions must be commenced within six years: . . . an action for which no
limitation is specifically prescribed by law” to include a declaratory action)
(referencing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (2002)). See also Samuelson v. Alvarado, 847
S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
152. Alicia v. Snyder, 748 N.E.2d 285, 289 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
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and set a strong precedent for Minnesota litigants to follow.
VII. CONCLUSION
In deciding Joseph, the Minnesota Supreme Court
unfortunately continued the use of claim preclusion as the res
judicata limit of declaratory actions in Minnesota and failed to give
153
an analysis adequate to support its decision. The decision will
154
deter litigants from using declaratory actions to avoid damages,
155
increase attorneys’ fees, and crowd court dockets by encouraging
156
litigants to bring full-fledged coercive suits. Finally, the decision
fails to clearly adopt a rule subjecting declaratory actions to statutes
of limitation.

153. Id. at 327.
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 33 cmt. c (1982).
155. Hisserich, supra note 4, at 160 (“By focusing on a specific issue at
contention between the parties, the court can resolve the problem relatively
quickly, avoiding the expense and strain of full-scale litigation.”).
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 33 cmt. c (1982).
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